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ABSTRACT
Internet of things (IoT) connects all items to the Internet through information-sensing devices to
exchange information for intelligent identification and management. Sybil attack is a famous and
crippling attack in IoT. Most of the previous methods of detecting Sybil attacks in IoT mainly focus
on static IoT while there are very rare methods applicable to mobile IoT. In this paper, a novel,
lightweight, and distributive detection scheme based on edge computing is proposed for detecting
Sybil attacks in mobile IoT. In the proposed scheme, a detection consists of two rounds. In each
round, member nodes are required to send packets to edge nodes. Edge nodes calculate a possible
interval of the received signal strength indication (RSSI) from the first round and check whether the
RSSI from the second round is in the interval to detect Sybil attack. Extensive experimental studies
are included to show that the presented approach outperforms many existing approaches in terms of
true detection and false detection rates. Moreover, experimental results show that the fault tolerance
design in the proposed approach greatly enhances the detection scheme.
Keywords Sybil Attack ·Mobile IoT · Edge Computing
1 Introduction
A revolutionary idea, IoT, has changed all people’s routine life and plays an indispensable role in many commercial and
scientific domains. IoT refers to a global network infrastructure composed of numerous connected devices that rely
on sensory, communication, networking, and information processing technologies [1]. Applications of IoT include
transportation, healthcare, industrial automation, and emergency response to natural and man-made disasters where
human decision making is difficult [2]. IoT is so large-scale and costly that it needs distributed management. Edge
computing provides an effective distributed management for IoT whose emergence further promises a bright future
for IoT to build intelligent industrial systems and smart cities [3]. In the early stage, IoT is composed of static sensor
nodes. Wireless sensor nodes are statically distributed on a large-scale information gathering system, which provides
significant data source for research and application of big data and artificial intelligence [4]. However, static nodes can
no longer meet the increasing social demands of applications for mobility. The advancement of mobile communication
technology significantly promotes the development of infrastructure and the applications of mobile devices.
Security issues are important and nonnegligible issues in IoT. A well-known malware called Mirai formed a botnet with
IoT devices as an infection target, injecting about 500 thousand IoT devices. On October 21st, 2016, Mirai launched
a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on US DNS provider Dyn, destroying the popular streaming service
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Netflix, Twitter and Airbnb. Among cyber attacks in IoT, Sybil attack is one of the most famous and destructive attacks
that affect network layers [5]. Sybil attack is defined as a malicious device which takes on multiple fake identities. Since
malicious nodes are able to gain legitimacy in a network, Sybil attack becomes an important auxiliary for other attacks.
Sybil nodes may launch further denial of service attacks such as channel jamming attacks and message suppression
attacks [6]. The routing of IoT may be damaged by a Sybil attack and many other problems may be caused such as data
aggregation, voting and fair resource allocation [7].
Many researchers have realized the hazard of Sybil attacks in IoT and several countermeasures have been proposed to
detect Sybil attacks including RSSI [8], neighboring information [9], Time Difference Of Arrival (TDOA) [10], Angle
Of Arrival (AOA) [11], random key pre-distribution and radio resource testing [12]. However, most of these detection
methods are designed based on node position or neighbour cooperation, which means these methods cannot directly
be applied in mobile IoT due to the mobility of nodes. In the literature, a few methods have been proposed to detect
Sybil attacks in mobile IoT. Piro et al. [13] introduced two methods called PASID and PASID-GD based on observer
monitoring. These two methods occupy much memory overhead, which may affect the original functions of sensor
nodes. Jamshidi et al. [14] presented a light-weight algorithm for detecting mobile Sybil nodes based on the movement
behaviour of the nodes. This method is not stable and robust because of its heavy dependency on historical records.
To overcome the shortcomings of the methods in mobile IoT, we propose a novel Sybil attack detection scheme based
on edge computing. Sybil attack detection needs storing and analysing quantities of feature data, which is difficult
for normal member nodes. With strong computation ability and large storage space, edge nodes are suitable for our
problem, which can collect, compute and analyse the status information of member nodes. Since the distance between
an edge node and a member node is short, it enables edge nodes to directly manage member nodes and consequently the
communication latency is reduced. Compared with cloud-based IoT systems, the distributed management of member
nodes through the edge nodes further improves the scalability of IoT networks. In our approach, most of the data stored
in sensor nodes will be cleared each time a detection is completed in order to eliminate the dependency on historical
records. As to the accuracy issue, we select the RSSI values that are related to the distances between edge nodes and
member nodes as the identifier to distinguish normal member nodes and malicious nodes. Specifically, RSSI values
keep changing when member nodes move in mobile IoT. Therefore, figuring out the theoretical range of numerical
fluctuations of RSSI is a vital part in this paper.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• A novel Sybil attack detection scheme is designed for mobile IoT. The information of member nodes including
RSSI is utilized to form a distinctive identifier of different member nodes, which can be further analyzed to
detect malicious nodes. The feature of the fluctuation of RSSI value when member nodes move is studied in
this paper, and the theoretical range of RSSI during a period of time is given. The proposed detection scheme
performs well in detection accuracy, which is verified with experimental studies.
• Edge computing is applied to reduce memory overhead and computation overhead of member nodes. Due to
the limited storage space, memory and electricity power, it is not supposed to make member nodes take on too
much responsibility in the detection as it may affect their original function. Edge nodes which have better
property without other tasks bear the responsibility for computing in the detection process. Independence from
historical data makes our method outperform other detection solutions in memory overhead.
• A fault tolerance algorithm is proposed to enhance the robustness of Sybil attack detection. Edge nodes
probably fail due to a harsh natural environment or human behavior. As a result, the ongoing detection is
likely to make mistakes. The basic idea in our fault tolerance algorithm is that each edge node has a substitute
with which it shares all the received information by applying heart beat technology. Experiments verify that
proposed algorithm remarkably eliminates the consequence cased by the failure of edge nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related work is reviewed. In Section 3, basic models are
discussed. In Section 4, our proposed detection scheme is described in detail. Section 5 introduces our augmented
design for fault tolerance. Section 6 presents simulation results. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Related Work
In this section, we introduce several typical approaches to detecting Sybil attacks in static IoT. We also present some
detection methods in mobile IoT along with the drawbacks of these methods.
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2.1 Methods in static IoT
The Sybil attack problem was first introduced by [5] for peer-to-peer distributed systems. Work [7] proved that a Sybil
attack is likely to affect the routing protocol in a wireless sensor network (WSN). Several methods were proposed
in [12] to defend against Sybil attacks, including Radio Resource Test (RRT), Code Attestation (CA), Random Key
Pre-distribution (RKP), Identity Registration (IR), and Position Verification (PV). Some other methods focus on the
information of nodes such as location, distance and angel. The TDOA-based mechanism [10] associates the TDOA ratio
with the sender’s identity. Once there are two different identities with the same TDOA ratio, a Sybil attack is detected.
In [15], an AOA based algorithm is proposed by taking advantage of the fact that the multi-identities created by a
malicious node have the same physical position. A beacon node identifies Sybil identities with signal phase difference
below a trusted threshold for adjacent sensor nodes. An RSSI based algorithm is introduced in [16] to estimate the
location of each node. As all Sybil nodes belong to a single malicious node, their values of RSSI are the same. Jakes
channel model is used in the RSSI-based method. Work [8] also used this mechanism by employing four detector nodes
to pinpoint sensor nodes in the environment. A new detection method is proposed in [17] based on both RSSI and
the status messages of member nodes which are accumulated in head nodes synthetically. However, all the methods
discussed above are designed for Sybil attack detection in static IoT rather than mobile IoT.
2.2 Methods in mobile IoT
In [13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], algorithms are proposed to detect Sybil attacks in mobile IoT. Work [13]
proposed two Sybil attack detection methods called PASID and PASID-GD based on observer monitoring. In PASID
and PASID-GD, individual nodes monitor all transmissions that they receive over many time intervals. They analyze
the data to find the suspicious nodes which often appear together and rarely apart. These two methods are short of
memory overhead because a large quantity of data needs to be stored. If the detection process used too much memory
overhead of a node, it might influence the normal function of the node. In [14] and [18], two algorithms are proposed
proposed two algorithms for detecting mobile Sybil nodes. Work [14] uses Watchdog Nodes first to label nodes based
on their movement behaviors, and then detects Sybil nodes according to these labels. In [18], observer nodes store
the occurrences of other nodes in a vector called history. The two algorithms rely on historical records, thus they are
unreliable over long time. In [20], a centralized method based on geographic location is proposed for detecting Sybil
attack in mobile sensor networks including three phases of clustering, selecting nodes nearby Sybil nodes, and routing
procedures. Obviously, the method is not proper. In [21], another centralized algorithm is proposed based on nodes’
registration in a base station, which has scalability issue. Work [22] proposed an algorithm using watchdog nodes,
which suffers from high communication overhead and high power consumption. In [23, 24, 25], three Sybil attack
detection techniques in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) are proposed. These three methods apply to VANET
cooperating with Road Side Units (RSU) and VANET server, which are not applicable to a more general context.
3 Problem Statement and System Model
In this section, the problem considered in this paper is presented. Necessary notations and models are given for later
discussion of our Sybil attack detection algorithm.
Table 1: Notations for problem statement
ui a normal member node or a malicious node
ej the j-th edge node
V the set of all nodes
V n normal nodes set
V m malicious nodes set
V e edge nodes set
dj
i distance between node ui and edge node ej
Rj
ir RSSI value from ui to ej in the r-th round, r=1, 2
ηr the ratio got in the r-th round, r=1, 2
vi the speed of ui
3
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Packet 
transfer
Sybil 
node
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of Sybil attack
3.1 Problem Statement
As shown in Figure 1, there are several normal nodes and malicious nodes (u1, u2, ..., un) distributed in an area,
which form a one-hop wireless network1. These nodes gather information and compute to accomplish some specific
assignments such as monitoring the environment. All these nodes are mobile within this area. Besides, there are several
high-energy nodes (e1, e2, ..., em) served as edge nodes. All the edge nodes are less mobile. It is assumed that each
node knows its own position exactly by using GPS or the algorithm in [26]. Each node has the ability to adjust its
transmission power to reach a far distant node [27].
Edge nodes are linked with each other and sensor nodes may communicate with edge nodes. The topology of the
linked nodes is determined by the communication pattern of the nodes. For the convenience of problem statement, we
view and treat all nodes as a graph. A set of linked nodes is denoted by a graph G = {V,E}, V = {V n, V m, V e},
V n = {u1, u2, ..., uk}, V m = {uk+1, uk+2, ..., un}, V e = {e1, e2, ..., em}. Here, V represents the set of all nodes,
and V n, V m, V e represent the normal node set, the malicious node set and the edge node set, respectively. |V | is the
number of nodes in G. The notations adopted in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
An adversary captures a number of normal nodes and reprograms them as malicious ones, such that each malicious
node forges many Sybil nodes. A Sybil node can influence not only its neighbours but also the other nodes, and it could
even perish the whole network. Sybil attack detection aims to kick out those malicious nodes without disturbing the
normal operation of the networks. True positive rate (TPR) and false negative rate (FNR) are significant indices of
evaluating a detection method. TPR is the percentage of normal nodes classified as normal nodes, while FNR is the
percentage of normal nodes mistaken as Sybil nodes. It is a typical trade-off problem. Due to the limitation of energy
and computing capacity, approaches to this problem are supposed to be concerned about energy consumption, memory
overhead and computation overhead of sensor nodes.
3.2 Network space channel model
In this paper, we adopt the Jakes model as network space channel model. Communications between nodes are related
with network space channel model. Jakes model is mostly used in wireless communication [28, 29]. William Jakes
found that Rayleigh fading process could be described by the sum of a series of complex sinusoid signals [30]. This
finding turned out to be a technology of simulating fading mobile wireless channel. In Jakes model, RSSI between ej
and ui is defined as
Rj
i =
Pt ∗ k
(dij)
α
. (1)
Here, Pt is the transmitted power, k is a constant, and dij is the Euclidean distance between ej and ui, which is
determined by
dij =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2. (2)
1In this paper, a packet transfer between an edge node and a member node finishes within one hop.
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α is distance-power descending ramp which depends on the deployed environment. According to [31], the principle
of choosing α is as follows: α = 2 for free space; α ∈ [1.6, 1.8] for buildings with line of sight connection; and α ∈
[2.7, 3.5] for urban area. In Jakes channel space, the signal strength is the function of the distance between two nodes
which communicate with each other. RSSI plays a significant role in our scheme because RSSI is only related to the
sending-receiving distance between two nodes. Our scheme is based on this characteristic of RSSI.
3.3 Mobility model
Since edge nodes are less mobile compared with member nodes, we assume that edge nodes keep static in a quite short
time interval. In reality, laptops can served as edge nodes and cellphones can served as member nodes. To verify the
correctness of our algorithm, we adopt way-point model as the mobility model in our paper.
4 Detection scheme of Sybil attack in a mobile environment
In this section, we provide a detailed explanation of our proposed scheme. Our detection process consists of two rounds.
In the first and the second round, edge nodes collect certain information from member nodes. In the judgment stage,
edge nodes analyze the information and decide the classification of member nodes.
4.1 Description of the detection scheme
In the first round at time t1, each member node ui is required to send a control packet to two closest edge nodes, e.g., e1
and e2. The control packet includes the identity of ui and the identity of another closest edge node. Upon receiving the
control packet, e1 and e2 respectively calculate the values of R1i1 and R2i1 using Eq. (1). Simultaneously, the control
packet to which R1i1 is appended is sent from e1 to e2. Define the ratio between R2ir and R1ir in the r-th round as
ηr =
R2
ir
R1ir
= (
di1
di2
)
α
. (3)
Upon receiving the control packet from e1, e2 calculates the ratio η1 by Eq. (3). At the same time, e2 figures out interval
I which shows the theoretical interval of feasible η2 value.
In the second round at time t2, edge nodes launch the requirement again. Therefore, all member nodes, including
normal nodes and malicious nodes, repeat the procedure again. e2 calculates the real ratio η2 by Eq. (3). Note that as ui
moves, the value of η2 does not equal to η1.
In the judgement stage, e2 compares identities claimed in the two batches of control packages from the above two
rounds to check whether they have the same ids. We classify possible scenarios when judging the identities of several
nodes. The possible scenarios are classified into three cases as follows. Let Fr and Sr represent the sets of the identities
in the packets gathered in the first round and in the second round respectively. We give the following example to
illustrate the three scenarios.
• Fr = {1, 2, 3, 4} Sr = {1, 2, 3, 4}
The four nodes are all normal nodes. Each node has the same id in both Fr and Sr and each node is judged as
a normal node.
• Fr = {1, 2, 3, 4} Sr = {1, 2, 3, 5}
The first three nodes are normal nodes and the last one is a Sybil node. The first three nodes has the same id in
both Fr and Sr while the fourth node changed its id from 4 to 5.
• Fr = {1, 2, 3, 4} Sr = {1, 2, 3, 5}
The first two nodes are normal nodes and the last two nodes are Sybil nodes. Id 3 in Fr and id 5 in Sr are for
the same node while id 4 in Fr and id 3 in Sr are for the same node.
There should be a large number of pairwise ids that are the same since the number of malicious nodes is relatively
smaller than that of normal nodes. This means that nodes with several different ids from two batches are likely to be
Sybil nodes. Figure 2 shows how a single node’s identity is judged as Sybil or normal in the detection. One possibility
is that a Sybil node claims an id at time t1, and claims another different id at time t2. In this situation, η2 which is
calculated using Eq. (3) is supposed to belong to interval I in theory because it is actually the same node. Therefore,
this node is judged as a Sybil node when η2 belongs to interval I . Otherwise, it needs base station to further check
whether it is a new member. In the case that an id in the first batch and another in the second batch are the same while
η2 does not belong to interval I , it is classified as a Sybil node.
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If η1 in I2
Round 1
Calculate η1 and I1
If η1 in I
Round 2
Calculate η
Begin
If ids are the same
YES NO
This is a normal node Base station checks whetherit is a new memberThis is a Sybil node
YES NO YES NO
This is a Sybil node
End
2
2
Figure 2: Flow chart of the proposed algorithm
4.2 Discussion of Interval I
Interval I is a critical important parameter in our detection process. It refers to a precise range between which the value
of η2 should be in during the detection process on a normal occasion. The strict mathematical verification is shown as
follows.
Our detection method can be extracted as a mathematical model as shown in Figure 3. In this two-dimension rectangular
coordinate system, pointN represents a member node ui. Points C1 and C2 represent edge nodes e1 and e2 respectively.
C1 and C2 are static while point N moves. All their positions at time t1 are marked in the figure. The circle with a
radius r centered on point N represents a possible scope where ui may move between time t1 and t2, labeled as O1.
The circle centered in point A in Figure 3 represents an apollonian circle, labeled as O2. According to Eq. (3), to figure
out interval I we just need to work out the range of NC2NC1 .
NC2
NC1
changes as point N moves in the circle with a radius r.
We denote
k =
NC2
NC1
. (4)
We assume the position of point N in motion as (x, y). Now we just need to figure out the range of k. For every positive
number k, there exists an apollonian circle O2 because points C1 and C2 are fixed while point N moves. Apollonian
circle refers to the trace of a point which has a specified ratio of distances to two fixed points known as foci. We have
the orbit
(x− k + 1
k − 1c)
2
+ y2 =
4k
(k − 1)2 c
2. (5)
Point N has to move in the scope of circle O1. Meanwhile, point N ’s trace is apollonian circle O2. For a fixed positive
number k, point N only moves in the arc of apollonian circle O2 in the scope of circle O1.
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C2(-c,0) C1(c,0) A(a,0)
N(x1,y1)
r
X
Y
C
R
M(m,0)
Rmin
Figure 3: Mathematical model for explaining the detection process
Considering the symmetry of NC2NC1 and
NC1
NC2
, we assume that the length of NC2 is greater than that of NC1, which
means k >1. Eq. (5) shows that the center of apollonian circle O2 is on the x axis. We find that the radius of apollonian
circle O2 decreases as k increases and the length between the two intersections of apollonian circle O2 and x axis
decreases as k increases. It means that apollonian circle O2 shrinks and it is wrapped by previous apollonian circles
completely as k increases. Therefore, k reaches the maximum value when circles O1 and O2 are tangent, as shown by
the red circle centered in point M in Figure 3.
For simplification, we let
t =
k + 1
k − 1 (6)
r = vi∆t. (7)
When circle O1 and circle O2 are tangent, t reaches the minimum value tmin and we get√
(x1 − ctmin)2 + y12 = r + c
√
tmin
2 − 1. (8)
Eq. (8) can be expressed as
−2x1ctmin + x12 + y12 + c2 − r2 = 2rc
√
tmin2 − 1. (9)
From Eq. (9), we can derive the following properties
Atmin
2 +Btmin + C = 0 (10)
A = 4x1
2c2 − 4r2c2 (11)
B = −4x1c(x12 + y12 + c2 − r2) (12)
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C = (x1
2 + y1
2 + c2 − r2) + r2c2. (13)
Then we get the minimum value of t and the maximum value of k as
tmin =
−B +√B2 − 4AC
2A
(14)
kmax =
tmin + 1
tmin − 1 . (15)
Consider the case that k < 1, the length of NC2 is less than that of NC1. NC2NC1 has the minimum value when
NC1
NC2
reaches the maximum value. The maximum value of NC1NC2 equals to kmax using Eq. (15). Therefore, the minimum
value of NC2NC1 is
kmin =
tmin − 1
tmin + 1
. (16)
Finally we have the interval I as
I = [
−2A−B +√B2 − 4AC
2A−B +√B2 − 4AC ,
2A−B +√B2 − 4AC
−2A−B +√B2 − 4AC ]. (17)
Algorithm 1 Sybil attack detection algorithm
1: for <i in [1,n]> do
2: for <j in [1,m]> do
3: Calculate Euclidean distance dij between ui and ej using Eq. (2)
4: Find out two edge nodes which is nearest, i.e., e1 and e2
5: end for
6: At time t1
7: ui sends a control package to e1 to e2 respectively
8: e1 calculates R1i1 using Eq. (1)
9: e2 calculates R2i1 using Eq. (1)
10: e1 send a package including R1i1 to e2
11: e2 calculates η1 using Eq. (3)
12: At time t2, repeat line 7-10
13: e2 calculates η2 using Eq. (3)
14: e2 calculates interval I using Eq. (17)
15: while not all packages have been handled do
16: if e2 received two same ids then
17: if η2 in I then
18: Return normal node
19: else
20: Return Sybil node
21: end if
22: else
23: if η2 in I then
24: Return Sybil node
25: else
26: Return normal node
27: end if
28: end if
29: end while
30: end for
8
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Y
XC2(-c,0) C1(c,0)
N(x1,y1)
r
C2’(m,n)
N’(x2,y2)
Figure 4: Diagram of fault tolerance algorithm
5 Augmented design for fault tolerance
In addition to the accuracy, the stability of the scheme is a key issue. Our detection scheme is based on the premise
that all edge nodes are safe and can work steadily all over the time. Some edge nodes may fail during the detection
process due to power failure or unexpected interference. To enhance the robustness and stability of our scheme, we add
an augmented design for fault tolerance.
To ensure all edge nodes are safe and legitimate, edge nodes that are responsible for detecting Sybil nodes are chosen
and set ahead of the detection. Given a complex natural environment, it is possible for these edge nodes to fail and lose
efficacy during the detection process. As a result, work that should have done by the invalid edge nodes is undertaken
by the rest of the edge nodes. Furthermore, the efficiency and the TPR of the detection system will decrease. One or
more Sybil nodes even may sneak through the detection process.
Our solution is to prepare a substitute for each edge node. Each original edge node is supposed to have a substitute edge
node. The substitute is set at a fixed place nearby its original edge node. Each substitute uses heartbeat technique to
check whether the original edge node is dead. Only when an original edge node fails, its substitute replaces it to work.
Figure 4 gives the diagram of fault tolerance algorithm for a wireless sensor network. Point N denotes a node point
while C1 and C2 denote edge nodes. C2 has a substitute, denoted by C
′
2, with which C2 always shares all the received
information timely. In the first round of a detection process, N sends a packet to C1 and C2 respectively. According to
the nature of the radio wave, C
′
2 can also calculate the distance away from N and records the distance. After a time
interval, N moves to another place (x2, y2) within a certain circle, denoted by N
′
. At this moment, C2 loses effect for
some reason such as charge failure before the beginning of the second round in this detection process. C
′
2 applies the
heartbeat technique finding C2 dead and replaces C2 at the same time. C
′
2 informs N
′
and C1 that the original edge
node is replaced immediately. In the second round of the detection process, N
′
and C1 communicate with C
′
2 instead
of C2 and finish this round of detection, as shown as the dotted lines in Figure 4.
Our fault tolerance algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. If no edge nodes die in the detection process, we perform
Algorithm 1 as normal. If there are edge nodes dead found by their substitutes, we immediately abort this round of
detection. Then we clear the dead edge nodes and replace them with their substitutes. Finally we perform Algorithm 1
as usual. The fault tolerance algorithm is quite easy to understand and it indeed improves the performance in the
experiments that we carry out in the next section.
6 Performance evaluation and simulation results
In this section, we first evaluate the overhead of our proposed algorithm in terms of memory, communication and
computation. Then we test our proposed algorithm and evaluate its performance through experiments.
9
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Algorithm 2 Fault-tolerant algorithm
1: if no edge nodes die then
2: Perform Algorithm 1
3: else
4: Return normal node
5: Abort this round
6: Clear dead edge nodes
7: Perform Algorithm 1
8: end if
6.1 Performance evaluation
Memory overhead of our method is analyzed as follows. In the first round of our detection process, each node sends a
control packet to two different edge nodes. The second round repeats this step. Each edge node needs to allocate part of
its memory to store all information in all the received control packets from the two rounds. After these two rounds,
each edge node clears all the information stored in this part of memory because the next rounds have nothing to do with
this information. Thus, no matter how many rounds there are in total, each edge node only needs to allocate memory
for two rounds. After p rounds, the memory overhead of all edge nodes is 4 × |V | × B bits, where |V | is the number
of all nodes including normal nodes and Sybil nodes, and B is the size of each packet in terms of bit. Therefore, the
imposed memory overhead for each edge node equals O( |V |×BC ), where C is the number of edge nodes. Accordingly,
if C increases, the imposed memory overhead for each edge node decreases. There is no memory overhead for each
node including normal nodes and Sybil nodes. In general, little memory overhead is generated in our algorithm.
Communication overhead of our method is also evaluated. Energy consumption of a detection method in IoT is a
big issue due to the limitation of sensor nodes’ energy. For a sensor node, sending and receiving packets consume
much more energy than other operations such as computation. The number of transmitted packets imposed during the
detection process is considered in our algorithm. In each detection process, all nodes send packets 4|V | times in total
and edge nodes send 2|V | packets in total. After R rounds, the number of transmitted packets is O(|V |×R). From the
perspective of reception, energy consumed when receiving a packet is proportional to the packet size. Communication
overhead depends on the number of all nodes and the number of rounds performed.
Computation overhead has influence on the performance of our method. Since only edge nodes need to compute, there
is no node which suffers from computation overhead. Computation is executed to process information in packets from
two rounds and to judge whether the identity of a node is fake. Time complexity for performing our algorithm in a
detection process is O(|V |×d), where d is the number of steps on judging the identity of a node, and it can be viewed
as a constant value. After R rounds, the computation overhead for each edge node equals O( |V |×d×pC ). Accordingly, if
C increases, the computation overhead for each edge node decreases.
6.2 Experiment results
A series of experiments are carried out in this section to evaluate the performance of our algorithm. We simulate the
detecting process with C++ language. Two metrics including TPR and FNR are considered in our experiments.
Several parameters effected our experiment results, such as the number of normal nodes and monitoring rounds. All the
parameters are shown in Table 4. Therefore, we evaluated these effects independently in five experiments. In the five
experiments, the network is comprised of N normal nodes and S Sybil nodes randomly distributed in a 100 x 100 m2
area. C edge nodes are set at some certain places in this sensing field. Each Sybil node can forge multiple identities as
many as the number of normal nodes. Radio range covers the whole area where nodes and edge nodes can communicate
with each other directly. Each experiment result was repeated 50 times to obtain an average value as the final value.
In the first experiment, we study the effect of the number of normal nodes on both the TPR and the FNR. Here the
parameters are S = 20, C = 4. The parameter N varies from 100 to 500 by the increment step of 100. The influence of
executive rounds is also studied. The parameter R varies from 20 to 100 by the increment step of 20. The results of
the first experiment is as shown in Figure 5. The first experiment demonstrates that as the number of normal nodes
increases, the TPR still remains at a high level. After several rounds, the TPR still exceeds 92%. As it was discussed
before, edge nodes will have recourse to the base station if there are id collisions found in the first round of a detection.
Base station can truly check the identity of a node which is an effective item for the TPR. In our algorithm, η2 belonging
to interval I is an essential hypothesis for a node to be judged as a normal node. Therefore, the TPR is very high.
Results also show that the number of normal nodes have a significant effect on the FNR. As the number of normal
10
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Table 2: Experimental parameters
Parameters Values
Network size 100 × 100 m2
Number of normal nodes N = 100, 200, 300, 400, 500
Number of edge nodes C = 2, 4, 8
Number of Sybil nodes S = 5, 10, 15, 20
Number of monitoring rounds R = 20, 40, 60, 80, 100
Speed of a member node vi ∈ [0, 0.5] m/s
Communication range between member nodes [0, 50] m
Table 3: Comparison of performance of the proposed algorithm and other latest algorithms in terms of TPR
Algorithm TPR
Jamshidi et al. [14] 94%
Jamshidi et al. [18] 99%
Yao et al. [24] 90%
Garip et al. [25] 87%
Proposed algorithm 92%
Figure 5: Effects of the number of normal nodes N on detection performance
nodes increases, the FNR decreases a little. When normal nodes is few in the network, mistaking a node as a Sybil node
increases the FNR dramatically.
Moreover, performance of the proposed algorithm is compared with other latest algorithms in terms of TPR. As
demonstrated in Table 3, TPR in the algorithms proposed by Jamshidi et al. [18] and Gandino et al. [19] is approximately
99%. In the algorithms proposed by Jamshidi et al. [14], TPR is about 94%. TPR in the algorithms proposed by [24]
and [25] is 90% and 87% respectively. Some algorithms outperform the proposed algorithm, whereas the proposed
algorithm has lower memory overhead, communication overhead, and computation overhead. Therefore, the results
verify the desired performance of the proposed algorithm.
In the second experiment, we study the effect of the number of Sybil nodes on both the TPR and the FNR. Here the
parameters are N = 100, C = 4. The parameter S varies from 5 to 20 by the increment step of 5. The influence of
executive rounds is also studied. The parameter R varies from 20 to 100 by the increment step of 20. Results from
the second experiment is similar to that of the first experiment. As the number of Sybil nodes increases, the TPR still
remains a high level and the FNR decreases accordingly. The results of this experiment is visualized in Figure 6.
In the third experiment, we study the effect of the number of edge nodes on both the TPR and the FNR. Here the
parameters are N = 100, S = 20. The parameter C takes three values, which are 2, 4, 8. The influence of executive
11
A PREPRINT - NOVEMBER 11, 2019
Figure 6: Effects of the number of Sybil nodes S on detection performance
Figure 7: Effects of the number of edge nodes C on detection performance
rounds is also studied. The parameter R varies from 20 to 100 by the increment step of 20. As illustrated in Figure 7,
results are very similar when C equals to 4 or 8. Performance is a little bit worse when C equals to 2. One explanation
is that all packets are processed only by the two edge nodes, which may cause errors.
6.3 Fault-tolerant experiments
In the fourth and fifth experiments, we study the performance of our fault-tolerant design. In the fourth experiment,
parameters are N = 100, S = 20. The parameter C is set as 8. The influence of executive rounds is also studied. The
parameter R varies from 20 to 100 by the increment step of 20. During this experiment, some of the edge nodes died
and their substitutes replaced them to continue the detection process. The performance of our algorithm is satisfying on
both the TPR and the FNR. This experiment demonstrates that the whole system works well even if some of the edge
nodes died. The polylines of this experiment as shown in Figure 8 are very similar to some polylines in Figure 7 in that
parameter C is proved to have little effect on the experiment results unless C is less than 4.
In the fifth experiment, parameters are N = 100, S = 20. The parameter C is set as 4. The influence of executive rounds
is also studied. The parameter R varies from 20 to 100 by the increment step of 20. During this experiment, some of the
edge nodes died and their substitutes replaced them to continue the detection process. The result of the fifth experiment
is a little different from that of the fourth experiment. The false negative rate as shown in Figure 9 decreases firstly and
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Figure 8: Fault tolerance experiment with 8 edge nodes
Figure 9: Fault tolerance experiment with 4 edge nodes
Table 4: Summary of experimental results
Parameter↑ True positive rate False negative rate
N – ↑
S – ↓
C l l
↑: increase
↓: decrease
− : nochange
l: uncertain
then increases. Reasonable explanation for this result is that the number of edge nodes is cut down to 2, which affects
the FNR of the experiment. The third experiment has proved this conclusion.
6.4 Summary of the experiments
Our proposed algorithm achieves more than 90% TPR and less than 10% FNR. Some conclusions in terms of parameters
in the experiments are summarized as follows.
• Decreasing the number of normal nodes decreases the FNR and has nearly no influence on the TPR.
• Increasing the number of Sybil nodes decreases the FNR and has nearly no influence on the TPR.
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• Increasing the number of edge nodes has nearly no influence on the TPR when the number of edge nodes is
greater than 2. But it affects the performance significantly when the number of the edge nodes equals to 2.
• Fault tolerance design for edge nodes works well when the number of edge nodes is less than 4.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel light-weight approach based on edge computing for detecting Sybil nodes
in mobile IoT. Edge nodes are utilized to collect, compute, analyze and store feature data of member nodes to detect
possible Sybil attack. A significant contribution of this paper is that we have figured out the feasible fluctuation interval
of member nodes’ feature data through strict mathematical verification. Moreover, we have designed a fault-tolerant
algorithm to adapt a severe environment. In theory, our algorithm has little memory overhead, communication overhead,
and computation overhead. Experimental results indicate that our algorithm performs well in mobile IoT. One drawback
of our algorithm is that the FNR of our method is a little susceptible, which can be resolved in future work by improving
the algorithm.
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